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SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE DISTRICT COURT:
THE OBSERVATIONS OF A
JOURNEYMAN TRIAL JUDGE
JAMES B. MCMILLAN*
Like most trial judges, I find my research usually confined to what is
needed to decide a particular question; broad-spectrum analysis of a whole
field of controversy-even if there were time to pursue it-is not my forte. This
brief paper will therefore reflect only the observations of one journeyman trial
judge who for more than six years has lived and worked closely with some
touchy school segregation problems.
What is the role of the social sciences in judicial decisions as to school
segregation? It is the same as its role in other matters of general public interest;
it is part of the facts and a source of enlightenment and should be considered
by the court.
Social science, briefly defined, is the study of human society, the interaction
of individuals in and with groups, and the welfare of people in society. Like the
legal profession, social science has its own ordained high priests, often with
M.A. or Ph.D. degrees. They are the experts. "Why," it has been asked,
"shouldn't we leave issues with social implications to experts in that field?" It is
a fair question. Judges are neither born nor chosen as experts in social prob-
lems. Most of us would welcome a change of venue to some never-never land
of expert and happy-and popular-decisions.
The trouble is, social science experts disagree, just as stockbrokers, doctors,
engineers, and lawyers do. The goals of education, for example, are today in
considerable dispute; former Chicago University President Robert M. Hutchins
recently remarked: "Since any free society is likely to be engaged in controversy
about the kind of society it ought to be, confusion about the kind of education
it ought to have seems inevitable."'
Somewhere, in a viable society, there must be a place of decision, where
public and individual issues can be settled, and where a path can be charted
through conflicting testimony and conflicting expert opinion. Americans tend
to go to court for these decisions. As a result, many of us, who once thought
Bacon was unique and brave when he proclaimed that he had "taken all
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knowledge to be my province,' '2 now sadly realize that he was just stating the
everyday but unattainable duty of every trial judge!
In this land the power of government is wisely, though often vaguely,
divided by our Constitution among executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
Of those three branches, on a federal level, obviously the legislative branch,
which appropriates over 300 billion dollars a year, and the executive, which
spends that much and more, are the most powerful-and the most influenced
by rankly political considerations. Though bound by the same constitutional
restraints and obligations as judges, they often ignore those restraints until
brought before a court where a judge has the unpleasant duty of calling those
restraints to their attention.
At their worst, courts are simply a third branch of power; they are the
places where day after day judges accept the dare to uphold the Constitution,
and where issues of lesser moment which cannot be decided elsewhere are
resolved. At their best, they are places where litigants get justice-where con-
troversies are decided on the basis of neutral principles of public morality and
law.
Courts, however, have no roving commission to seek out and right wrongs;
the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited; and they, fortunately, are only
authorized to decide a question after it has been presented as a "case or con-
troversy" under a pertinent statutory or constitutional provision.
Courts have no money, no troops, no CIA, and no police force except the
limited number of United States marshals. Federal courts in 1974 cost the
taxpayers approximately one fourteenth of one per cent of the federal budget
(before credit is taken for fines, costs, penalties and other collections by the
courts).3 The other branches of government cost us almost four times as much
every day as the courts do in an entire year! Courts tend to stay busy and to be
overloaded. Federal procedure permits dispatch but invites delay. The num-
bers of judges and the numbers of supporting personnel are inadequate to
provide fast or consistent justice. It could be said that the federal courts today
are like the household gods or icons of the ancient nomads; they look good on
the tent rail and they speak high moral platitudes, but we keep them in their
place and restrict their power so that their less palatable orders can be "more
honour'd in the breach than in the observance.' '
How, then, is it that courts are still listened to in large affairs? It is my own
conviction after twelve years of judging spread over more than a quarter of a
century that courts are heard and obeyed because they provide a forum where
all sides can be heard; because they try to find the truth from a study of facts
2. Bacon, Letter to Lord Burghle, 1592, in I J. SPEDDING, THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF FRANCIS
BACON 108, 109 (1890).
3. THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1974, at 175-78 (1973).
4. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, 1, iv, 14.
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rather than debate about theory; and because they try to do right based upon
fundamental principles of fairness, justice, and morality.
This, of course, states an ideal. Not all judges and writers agree with that
ideal. Moreover, a trial judge and, to a much lesser extent a circuit court of
appeals judge, is often bound by a controlling statute or precedent. Such
statutes or precedents must themselves in time stand the test of justice and
morality and usually have so stood that test. However, in many-perhaps
most-judicial problems there is room to decide more than one way; and de-
bate has raged throughout history over the true foundations of such decisions.
Some of the better known theories of judicial decision are pragmatism, 5 likeli-
hood of success,6 and likelihood of future acceptance.' It even has been sug-
gested that courts as a third branch are simply wielding raw power and should
admit it. Time does not permit debate with such noted scholars as Judges
Craven and Wright and Professors Bickel and Wechsler on the abstract bases
of judicial decisions.
Fortunately, it is not necessary to resolve that debate in order to evaluate
the role of social science in judicial decision-making; these human factors in a
legal problem are not the monopoly of either "conservative" or "liberal" jurists
and they must be weighed by those who are attacked as judicial "activists" and
by those who call themselves "strict constructionists."
Whether motivated by principle or by pragmatism, a judge worthy of the
name must reckon with facts before he decides. Neither principle nor "prag-
matism" has any meaning in a vacuum. The pragmatist must know the score
before his pragmatic computer can be fed. The principled jurist must know
what happened before he knows what principle applies. Neither the tenth
amendment nor the fourteenth amendment relates to a particular controversy
except in terms of the grubby, everyday facts-the questions as to who did what
to whom, and when and where; whether it was done or countenanced by
government authority and, if so, which branch; who gains and who loses from
it; what constitutional provision or what statute authorizes the case to come to
court. Neither the most starry-eyed idealist nor the most hard-core realist can
judge what is pragmatic or what is principled until he has dug out and under-
stood the facts necessary to decide the question before him.
School segregation cases are not unique in this regard; and they are not
unique in their dependence upon a great deal of principle and controversy and
opinion which goes under the name of "social science." How can an intelligent
or just decision, pragmatic or principled, be made without weighing considera-
5. "... . [E]xpediency: What is best for the nation?" Craven, Paean to Pragmatism, 50 N.C.L. REV.
977, 981 (1972).
6. Kurland, Earl Warren, the "Warren Court," and the Warren Myths, 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968).
7. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99 (1970). Compare Wright,
Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971), with
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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tions of social science in any case involving such well known legal shibboleths as
"due process," "equal protection," "public interest," "commerce," "abstention,"
"legitimate state interest," "cruel and unusual," "reasonable doubt," "bad
faith," "political thicket," "fair trial," "free press," "free speech" or "privilege";
and who can forget the volumes of sociology, genetics, economics, and first and
fourteenth amendment problems which Justice Holmes once compressed into
six words: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."'
Illustrations of the use of data and opinions from the social sciences abound
in both recent and early school segregation decisions. Brown v. Board of
Education" may have been "bad" law when read solely against the historical facts
that some framers of the Constitution owned slaves, and that segregation had
been officially tolerated and enforced for sixty years since Plessy v. Ferguson.i°
But though it may have been technically "bad" law when read purely against
those precedents, it would be hard to challenge its basic message from the
standpoint of strict construction of the Constitution, of equal protection of
laws, of morals, of economics, of equity, fairness and justice, of the progress of
society as a whole and of its individual members, and of the Judeo-Christian
ethic (perhaps not unique, but ours) which professes to treat men as equal in
the sight of God regardless of their condition or fortune. Those things were
made the law of the land in the decision (principled or pragmatic) in Brown;
and whether the persuasion came from Gunnar Myrdal or other sources,"i the
Supreme Court was talking sociology12 which ought to have been law when it
said: "To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to
be undone."' 3 Quoting a lower court opinion, the Supreme Court continued: 14
'Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the [N]egro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of [N]egro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.'
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
8. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. The Brown Court noted that its finding that state-imposed racial segregation has a detri-
mental effect on minority children was "amply supported by modern authority"-referring in the
now-famous footnote to the works of Professor Kenneth B. Clark and Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, among
others. 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11. See G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
12. But see, e.g., Cahn,jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.L. REV. 150, 159 (1955).
13. 347 U.S. at 494.
14. Id.
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Plessy v. Ferguson itself created a segregated society by relying upon an
erroneous sociological premise-that separate facilities could be equal. Brown v.
Board of Education corrected and reversed that premise.1 5 In Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 6 before reaching any conclusions, the
district court went to considerable pains to review thousands of pages of
sociological evidence, most of it from official school board and other govern-
ment files, and found as fact that segregation in Charlotte was caused and
required by numerous discriminatory governmental actions.1 7
15. Id. Even before Brown, there were indications that the "separate but equal" principle was
being undermined, at least in the area of higher education. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950).
16. 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
17. Id. at 1365-66.
Charlotte (270,000-plus) sits in the center of Mecklenburg County (550 square miles,
total population over 335,000). The central city may be likened to an automibile hub cap,
the perimeter area to a wheel, and the county area to the rubber tire.... Charlotte
originally grew along the Southern railroad tracks. Textile mills with mill villages, once
almost entirely white, were built. Business and other industry followed the highways and
the railroad. The railroad and parallel highways and business and industrial development
formed something of a barrier between east and west.
By the end of World War 11 many Negro families lived in the center of Charlotte ....
However, the bulk of Charlotte's black population lived west of the railroad . . . and . .. in
the northwest part of town. The high priced, almost exclusively white, country was east
.... Charlotte thus had a very high degree of segregation of housing before the first
Brown decision.
Among the forces which brought about these concentrations should be listed the origi-
nal location of industry along and to the west of the southern railroad; the location of
Johnson C. Smith University two miles west of Tryon Street; the choice of builders in the
early 1900's to go south and east instead of west for high priced dwelling construction; the
effect of private action and public law on choice of dwelling sites by black and by white
purchasers or renters; real estate zoning which began in 1947; and the economics of the
situation which are that Negroes have earned less money and have been less able to buy or
rent expensive living quarters.
Local zoning ordinances starting in 1947 generally allow more varied uses in the west
than in the east. Few if any areas identified as black have a residential restriction stronger
than R-6, which means that a house can be built on a lot as small as 6,000 square feet.
Zoning restrictions in other areas go as high as 12,000 and 15,000 square feet per lot. ...
Many black citizens live in areas zoned industrial, which means that the zoning law places
no restriction on the use of the land.
[C]oncentration of Negroes in the northwest continues. Under the urban renewal prog-
ram thousands of Negroes were moved out of their shotgun houses in the center of town
and have relocated in the low rent areas to the west. This relocation of course involved
many ad hoc decisions by individuals and by city, county, state and federal governments.
Federal agencies (which hold the strings to large federal purses) reportedly disclaim any
responsibility for the direction of the migration; they reportedly say that the selection of
urban renewal sites and the relocation of displaced persons are matters of decision ("free-
dom of choice"?) by local individuals and governments. This may be correct; the clear fact
however is that the displacement occurred with heavy federal financing and with active
participation by local governments, and it has further concentrated Negroes until 95% or
so of the city's Negroes live west of the Tryon-railroad area, or on its immediate eastern
fringes.
Onto this migration the 1965 school zone plan with freedom of transfer was superim-
posed. The Board accurately predicted that black pupils would be moved out of their
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It was the view of the district court at that time, and now, that no answer to
the question of discrimination could be given without a serious and careful
study of that information. It was indeed thought that the data summarized by
the court gave a full picture of how urban segregation had come to pass and
was still being maintained by the most powerful of human forces--gov-
ernmental and otherwise. That such is not a unanimous view is illustrated in
the Fourth Circuit decision in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond."8
Despite the fact that the district court's findings' 9 in that case were rather
midtown shotgun housing and that white residents would continue to move generally
south and east. Schools were built to meet both groups. Black or nearly black schools
resulted in the northwest and white or nearly all white schools resulted in the east and
southeast. Freedom of students of both races to transfer freely to schools of their own
choices has resulted in resegregation of some schools which were temporarily desegre-
gated. The effect of closing the black inner-city schools and allowing free choices has in
overall result tended to perpetuate and promote segregation.
18. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
19. 338 F. Supp. 67, 84-92 (E.D. Va. 1972).
Not only do the existing barriers have no relation to natural obstacles or substantial
governmental interests, but they are related to strict housing segregation patterns, main-
tained by public and private enforcement and owing their genesis in substantial part to the
manner in which the three school divisions have been operated and expanded. Thus by
the maintenance of existing school division lines the State advantages itself of private
enforcement of discrimination and prolongs the effects of discriminatory acts of its own
agents. . . . The proof here overwhelmingly establishes that the school division lines
between Richmond and the counties here coincide with no natural obstacles to speak of
and do in fact work to confine blacks on a consistent, wholesale basis within the city, where
they reside in segregated neighborhoods. ...
The longer term impact of the [school construction] policy has been the exaggeration of
the racial disproportion between the city and the two neighboring counties. This has come
about by virtue of the maintenance of school division lines as obstacles to pupil assignment
for purposes of desegregation while the area's housing patterns, when its population grew,
became increasingly segregated. The continued operation of the schools of each subdivi-
sion as racially identifiable facilities moreover necessarily caused each new school and old
ones as well to take on the label of a black or white school.
Furthermore, not only has the manner of expansion of the community's school plant
been such as to partake of the discrimination inherent in its housing patterns, but also it
has played a substantial part in the development of those patterns. In addition, school
officials have been abetted in the perpetuation of housing discrimination by other gov-
ernmental agencies.
The interdependency of housing and school segregation is fully established by the
record. Schools were planned with an eye to separate racial occupancy and opened as
such, with zone and division lines imposed upon segregated housing patterns. .... Overall,
the area's population expanded, and over time black residents, with fewer options so far as
housing was concerned, comprised a greater and greater proportion of the city's residents,
while the area's whites occupied the suburban counties.
This was not beyond the power of school authorities in each of the areas and in the
State's central offices to influence. By maintaining black schools and white schools, per-
ceived as such, to serve particular areas, they turned such force as might have been
exerted by school policies to assist in eliminating housing segregation in the opposite
direction. Because the area's overall population was expanding, the consequences of the
maintenance of segregated school systens were extreme.
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similar to those made by the district court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,20 the Fourth Circuit said: "We think that the root causes of
the concentration of blacks in the inner cities of America are simply not known
and that the district court could not realistically place on the counties the
responsibility for the effect that inner city decay has had on the public schools
of Richmond."' '
Social science weapons are therefore legitimate; they may serve either or
both views of a question; their effect depends upon which direction they can be
aimed. Whether the judicial inquiry relates to the "track system";22 to the "open
school" (like the three-teacher, eleven-grade school which I first attended); to
problems of student discipline;2 3 to the language segregation recently con-
demned in Lau v. Nichols;24 or to any other of the myriad garbs in which
discrimination can be clothed, social science can add valuable information and
opinion to responsible judging-pragmatic, principled, or otherwise. Social sci-
ence, therefore, is entitled to a respected place in the halls of justice. The study
of people and their problems is a natural prerequisite of the legal decision of
problems among people.
The departure of whites, as has occurred in the City, in the face of an increasing black
component was predictable, but it was only possible-and only had reason to occur-when
other facilities, not identifiable as black, existed within what was in practical terms, for the
family seeking a new residence, the same community.
In league with the defendant school administrators in perpetuating the dual school
system to the extent that entire city and county school divisions have acquired the label of
racial identifiability have been governmental agencies controlling the evolution of housing
patterns in the area. Segregation in housing patters [sic], once established, perpetuates
itself and expands. New residents adhere to established patterns; private realtors adhere
to governmentally enforced practices; and the pattern, once set, acquires an impetus of its
own. The public housing policy in the area has, by action and inaction of the governmen-
tal bodies involved, contributed to school segregation. County policy has excluded low
income housing entirely; in the city itself such housing has been barred when it might
contribute to housing desegregation, and efforts to place it in mainly white areas in the
city or the counties have been abandoned.
Federal policy to perpetuate segregated residential development and the use of racially
restrictive convenants have also forced the area's housing into racially defined patterns. It
is not decisive that the sources of these forces now no longer promote them; the momen-
tum of discrimination continues.
20. 300 F. Supp. 1358 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See note 17 supra.
21. 462 F.2d at 1066.
22. Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971); Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd en banc sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
23. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND OF THE WASHINGTON
RESEARCH PROJECT, INC., CHILDREN OUT OF SCHOOL IN AMERICA (1974).
24. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
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